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STATEMENT OP FACTS 
The Appellant stands on the Statement of Facts submitted in 
his initial Memorandum filed with this Court. Although Respondent 
has failed to cite to the record to support the allegations set 
forth in his Statement of Facts, Appellant would generally accept 
those facts with the exception of Paragraph No. 7. In Paragraph 
No. 7, only the first sentence, alleging that Mr. Thomas moved to 
the State of Wyoming in 1984, has any basis in the record. The 
rest of the "facts" set forth are unfounded and unsupported 
conclusions and allegations and should be disregarded. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS MATTER INVOLVES A CIVIL APPEAL AND CIVIL SANCTIONS. 
A* This Proceeding is a Civil Proceeding. 
In Respondent's Brief, Respondent begins with the erroneous 
assumption that the proceedings before this Court are in some 
nature criminal proceedings. 
While the sole existing contempt order entered by the trial 
court, which survives, is a criminal contempt order, the issues 
before this Court are purely civil in nature. This case is an 
appeal from an order of summary judgment entered by the trial court 
in a case brought to renew a civil judgment. 
There is no provision in the criminal law for a motion for 
summary judgment. Nor is there any provision in the criminal law 
for an action for a renewal of judgment that would end this case. 
This Court has already held the current proceedings are nothing but 
an extension of prior civil proceedings. Accordingly, it would be 
inappropriate to limit the discussion of this matter to issues 
relating solely to criminal contempt. 
B. Dismissal Is Inappropriate Even In A Criminal Context. 
Respondent argues that this Court's decision in D1Aston v. 
D1Aston, 790 P.2d 590 (Utah App. 1990) is inapplicable because we 
are in a criminal and not a civil context. As demonstrated above, 
this is not correct. However, even if we were operating in a 
criminal context as opposed to a civil context, the D1Aston 
decision would still apply, and dismissal would still be inappro-
priate. 
In D'Aston, this Court recognized that no Utah Appellate Court 
had previously rendered a decision on the availability of the 
sanction of staying or dismissing an appeal for failure of an 
appellant Lu comply with a trial court's order in the same or a 
related proceeding. 
Accordingly, this Court examined the law of other jurisdic-
tions and the law in the State of Utah relating to dismissal of 
appeals in criminal settings. The very underpinnings of the 
DfAston decision therefore, are based in an examination of existing 
criminal l<aw, the law of other jurisdictions and perhaps most 
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importantly, an analysis of the requirements under the Utah State 
Constitution. 
An examination of this case under the cited Utah State 
criminal authority and Statutory and Constitutional provisions 
clearly demonstrates that dismissal would be inappropriate in this 
case. In Respondent's Brief, he cites to the case of Hardy v. 
Morris. 636 P.2d 473 (Utah, 1981), for the proposition that the 
criminal appeal of an escaped prisoner can be dismissed. 
Respondent's ignore the fact that Hardy was explained in the case 
of State v. Tuttle. 713 P. 2d 703 Utah 1985) wherein the Utah 
Supreme Court held that an appellant prisoner's escape "is not an 
abandonment of his right to an appeal and that the dismissal of his 
appeal is not an appropriate punishment for his escape". D'Aston 
at 593. 
Respondent goes on to argue that because an escaped criminal's 
criminal appeal can be dismissed until he is recaptured, Mr. 
Thomas' appeal should -be dismissed because he is outside of the 
jurisdiction of the authorities of Kane County. 
The inapplicability of the Hardy and Tuttle cases to the 
present case is rather obvious. Both Hardy and Tuttle dealt with 
scenarios in which a prisoner had escaped and fled custody. The 
fact that the inmates were at large, indicates that they were free 
to return to custody at whatsoever time they chose. This is in 
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contrast with Mr. Thomas' situation where he is currently in 
custody, he is simply in custody some place else. He clearly has 
no present ability to conform to any court's order. As is 
discussed below, this matter of impossibility is the key to the 
entire issue currently, before this Court. 
II. DISMISSAL OF THIS APPEAL IS AN INAPPROPRIATE SANCTION 
A. The Actions of This Court Constitute a Separate Contempt 
Proceeding. 
Throughout Respondent's Brief, there runs an erroneous thread 
of thought that this Court is seeking to enforce the original order 
which Mr. Thomas failed to comply with. That is not the case. 
This Court is instead seeking to punish Mr. Thomas for his failure 
to serve a thirty (3 0) day jail sentence which was imposed on Mr. 
Thomas and upheld by the Supreme Court. Mr. Thomas' failure to 
appear resulted in a contempt order being entered against him. 
This Court now seeks additional sanctions. These new 
sanctions, constituting the stay or dismissal of Mr. Thomas' 
appeal, are not based upon his failure to appear before the court 
as previously ordered, but are rather based on Mr. Thomas' failure 
t6 serve the jail ^ enLeiice." *As~^udh, this constitutes^an entirely 
separate contempt proceeding. 
Because this is a new contempt proceeding, the question of 
impossibility is to be measured now, at the time the sanction is 
sought to be imposed. Bradshaw v. Kershaw. 627 P.2d 528 (Utah 
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1981). Furthermore, Mr. Thomas should be afforded the due process 
protections which must be satisfied in a contempt proceeding. This 
would include a finding of a present ability to perform. Since 
such a finding cannot be made, the Appeal should proceed. 
It would be inappropriate to dismiss Mr. Thomas' appeal. 
B. Respondent Fails To Correctly Address The Impossibility 
Defense. 
The Respondent seeks to deny the availability of the impossi-
bility defense to Mr. Thomas based on the fact Mr. Thomas had 
previous opportunities to comply with the Court's Order that he 
serve thirty (30) days in the Kane County jail. The problem with 
this analysis is that the issue is not what Mr. Thomas could or 
could not have done previously, but rather what is Mr. Thomas' 
ability to perform at the time the sanction is sought to be 
imposed. 
In Bradshaw. the Utah Supreme Court held: 
When the proposed sanction is coercive imprisonment, 
the defense of impossibility o^f .performance as of the 
time the sanction is to be imposed would always" be 
available without regard to how or by whom the condition 
of impossibility occurred. It is obviously repugnant to 
reason and futile to try to coerce an act that the 
contemnoi has no present ability to perform. . . conse-
quently, the defense of impossibility is uniformly held 
available to this type of sanction. In fact, the 
sanction cannot be imposed without an affirmative finding 
of present ability to comply. 
Bradshaw at 531. 
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The Supreme Court's language is clear. Where the issue is one 
of coercive imprisonment, the time for evaluating the defense of 
impossibility of performance is the time that the sanction is to be 
imposed. This Court is seeking to impose a sanction now of 
dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal, while it is undisputed that Mr. 
Thomas has no present ability to perform. Furthermore, as the 
Supreme Court clearly stated, the defense is available irrespective 
as to how or by whom the condition of impossibility occurred. 
Under the plain language of the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bradshaw, the dismissal of Mr. Thomas' appeal is therefore 
inappropriate. 
C A Dismissal Without Prejudice of Mr. Thomas' Appeal Would 
Be Inequitable. 
The underlying case in this appeal is one for a renewal of a 
judgment. It is Mr. Thomas' position that the judgment sought to 
be renewed is now void. Staying this matter, or dismissing it with 
a right of later reinstatement would allow the respondents to 
continue collections action against Mr. Thomas during the interven-
ing period of time. Mr. Thomas does not have the financial 
capability of filing a supersedeas~bdna irf^ this matter. Therefore, 
any assets which Mr. Thomas might come into control of will be 
subject to the depredations of the Respondents even though it is 
Mr. Thomas' view that after the issues of this appeal are consid-
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ered on all of their merits, Respondents will have no rights to 
take further collections action* 
On one point, both parties are in agreement, a stay of this 
matter would be inappropriate. The difference is that Appellant 
would request this Court address the issues on their merits, while 
the Respondents would simply have things continue in a status quo, 
allowing them to continue their collection efforts. 
Unlike the scenario in DfAston, where compliance with the 
court's order was necessary to protect the ability of the Respon-
dent to collect on its judgment if such judgment were upheld, Mr. 
Thomas' serving of thirty (30) days in the Kane County Jail, while 
perhaps giving some emotional satisfaction to the Respondents, 
would in no manner improve their possibilities of recovering their 
judgment or protect their interests in any way. 
Delay of this matter simply delays justice. In this case the 
adage is true that justice delayed is justice denied. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue in this case is an issue of civil law and not 
criminal. Whether the Court accepts the view of the Appellant that 
the Court's actions comprise a new action for contempt or the view 
of the Respondent that this is simply an attempt on the part of the 
Court*to enforce the prior order of the trial court sentencing Mr. 
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Thomas to thirty (3 0) days in jail, the defense of impossibility is 
available and precludes a dismissal of this appeal. 
In addition to the considerations and arguments raised above, 
Mr. Thomas' would draw the court's attention to the constitutional 
arguments raised in his initial memoranda. Those arguments have 
not been responded to in any manner within the Respondent's Brief, 
and accordingly will not be dealt with further here. 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Thomas respectfully requests this Court vacate 
the prior Order of Dismissal and consider this case on its merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this J_ day of April, 1994. 
BROWN, LARSON, JENKINS & HALLIDAY 
Shawn D. Turner 
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